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Abstract
We present maximum likelihood estimates of a small scale dynamic
general equilibrium model for the Eurozone. We pay special attention
to the role of money, both through its direct effect upon private agents’
decisions and as a component of the monetary policy rule. Our results
can be summarized as follows. First, we find no direct effect of money
upon inflation and output but money growth plays a significant role in
the interest rate rule. Second, money demand shocks mainly help to
forecast real balances while real shocks explain the bulk of price, output
and interest rates fluctuations. Third, the estimated model predicts sen-
sible conditional correlations among those variables both to demand and
supply disturbances. Finally, the systematic response of interest rates
to money growth does not seem to have affected the output-inflation
variability trade-off.
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1. Introduction
This paper presents a maximum likelihood estimation of a small scale dynamic
general equilibrium model of the business cycle for the euro area. We pay special
attention to the role of money in shaping the joint evolution of output, interest
rates and prices. An essential feature of this approach is that we make use of all
the cross-restrictions implied by the theoretical model, which affect the dynamics
of the endogenous variables and the structural sources of fluctuations. Thus, we
go one step further with respect to the more conventional method of estimation,
on an equation-by-equation basis, of which the Area Wide Model of Fagan, Henry
and Mestre (2001) is the best example to date. To some extent our work is akin
to that of Coenen and Wieland (2000), although these authors only focus on the
inflation-output dynamics through the estimation of an overlapping wage contract
à la Taylor, leaving the demand side and the money market unrestricted. A much
closer approach to ours is that in Smets and Wouters (2001), who estimate a
dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the business cycle in the euro area,
although with no explicit role for money.
Our model is an extension of Ireland’s (2001) and can be described in terms of
four building blocks. Three of these come from the optimal agent’s decisions: the
intertemporal allocation of consumption, the Phillips curve and a money demand
equation. The model is augmented with an interest rate rule, which does not
admit a truly structural interpretation (since the European Central Bank was
inexistent before 1999) but that is a necessary device to allow for the existence of
a unique rational expectations stationary equilibrium.
Optimal choices made by households and firms result in forward-looking de-
mand and supply schedules, which makes it difficult to account for the inertia
observed in output and prices. This issue has recently been subject to substantial
empirical research from two different perspectives. On the one hand, authors like
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) advocate some ad-hoc mechanisms in both demand and
supply to match the persistence and the dynamic cross correlations observed in
the data. Other papers, like Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999), emphasize
the importance of sticking to solid microfoundations to understand economic re-
lationships, allowing for higher order autocorrelations in the unobservable as well
as for cross correlations among them instead. In this paper we extend the lat-
ter approach by considering the role of habit formation in consumer preferences
(Fuhrer (2000) and Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2000)) but we also allow for
a subset of backward-looking price setters (Galí and Gertler (1999)).
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There is a lively debate about the merits of the ECB’s “two pillars” strategy
for conducting its policy, in which monetary aggregates are given a large weight
as indicators of future inflation. Several papers have used the P* model to look
at this issue (see, for example, Gerlach and Svensson (2000)), while ours can be
viewed as complementary to those in that the role of real balances is assessed
in a model with well-rooted microfoundations. In this respect our main result
is that the business cycle influence of money balances seems to have been very
limited during the sample period. Preferences are separable between consumption
and real balances and the policy rule, although with a significant response of the
nominal rate to money growth, can be written as a flexible targeting inflation rule.
We also obtain that money demand shocks explain very little of the variability
of output, inflation and nominal interest rates, while account for most of the real
balances fluctuations.
These results are obtained in models whose estimated parameters are in general
both reasonable and similar to others available in the literature. Preferences are
(near to) logarithmic in consumption, display high habit dependence and are
strikingly robust across specifications. The supply side parameters differ across
specifications. In models without consumption persistence the estimated Phillips
is close to the one obtained by Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001) in a partial
equilibrium framework. In particular, we find supporting evidence of an important
forward-looking component in driving inflation dynamics as well as of some non-
negligible price inertia. When the model allows for habit formation the estimated
supply side is consistent with much less price stickiness and with a high labor-
supply elasticity. Finally, the conditional correlations (impulse-responses) and the
contribution of the estimated sources of fluctuations to the forecast error of the
main variables are consistent with those found in the literature.
Section 2 presents the model economy. Section 3 describes the maximum
likelihood estimates of alternative models. Section 4 analyses the quantitative
implications of the estimated models in terms of the volatility and the persistence
of the variables as well as in terms of both impulse-responses and forecast vari-
ance decompositions of the variables to structural shocks. Section 5 presents two
counterfactual policy exercises to further assess the role of money in the model.
Section 6 concludes.
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2. Money in a Sticky Price Model
In this section we set out the basic equations of the model, whose predecessors can
be found in McCallum and Nelson (1999), Woodford (1999), and more recently
Ireland (2001), among others. The economy consists of a representative household,
a continuum of producing firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] and a monetary authority.
The model features enough symmetry so that the analysis can be focused on the
behavior of a representative goods-producing firm.
2.1. Households
The representative household of the economy maximizes the following expected
stream of utility:
E0
∞X
t=0
βt at
·
U(Ct,
M
etPt
)− N
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
¸
(2.1)
where Ct is the CES aggregator of the quantities of the different goods consumed:1
Ct =
µZ 1
0
Ct(j)
ε−1
ε dj
¶ ε
ε−1
Mt/Pt and Nt represent real balances and hours, respectively; at is a preference
shock and et is a shock to the demand for real balances. The parameter β ∈
(0, 1) is a discount factor and ϕ ≥ 0 represents the inverse of the Frisch labor
supply elasticity.2 The marginal utility of consumption depends upon real balances
but it is independent of labor supply decisions. In addition, the assumption of
separability between a consumption-real balances basket and hours implies that
aggregate demand relationships are invariant to the specification of the firm’s
problem (Driscoll (2000)).
The budget constraint is:
Mt−1 +Bt−1 +WtNt + Tt +Dt
Pt
= Ct +
Bt/rt +Mt
Pt
(2.2)
1Pt =
³R 1
0
Pt(j)
1−ε dj
´ 1
1−ε
is the aggregate price index that is consistent with the first order
conditions of the producing firms that face the differenciated demand and Pt(j) is the price of
good j.
2When ϕ = 0 preferences are linear in labor (Hansen (1985)) and the labor-supply elasticity
is infinite.
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Households enter period t with money holdings Mt−1 and bonds Bt−1. At the
beginning of the period they receive lump sum nominal transfers Tt, labor income
WtNt, where Wt denotes the nominal wage, and a nominal dividend Dt from the
firms. They use some of these funds to purchase new bonds at nominal cost Bt/rt,
where rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate between t and t+1. The household
carries Mt units of money into the period t+ 1.
2.2. Firm Behavior and Price Setting
The production function for firm j is,
Yt(j) = ztNt(j)
1−α (2.3)
where Yt(j) is output Nt(j) represents the number of hours hired from the house-
hold (i.e., Nt =
R 1
0
Nt(j) dj), ztis a common technology shock and (1 − α) is the
elasticity of labor with respect to output. Letting Yt =
³R 1
0
Yt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
´ ε
ε−1
the
market clearing condition implies Yt = Ct.
The representative firm sells its output in a monopolistically competitive mar-
ket and sets nominal prices on a staggered basis, as in Calvo (1983). Each firm
resets its price with probability 1 − θ each period, independently of the time
elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus, each period a measure 1 − θ of pro-
ducers reset their prices, while a fraction θ simply adjust prices at the pace of
steady-state inflation, π, (i.e. non-adjusting firms simply set: Pt(j) = Pt−1(j)π).
Hence, θk will be the probability that the price set at time t will still hold at
time t + k. Notice that, if there were no constraints on the adjustment of prices
the typical firm would set a price according to the rule Pt(j) = ( εε−1)MCt(j) ,
where MCt(j) is the nominal marginal cost, εε−1 is the steady-state price markup
and
MCt(j) =
Wt
∂Yt(j)
∂Nt(j)
As emphasized by Galí and Gertler (1999), this framework implies that infla-
tion is a purely forward-looking variable. Nevertheless, recent research has pointed
out the importance of allowing for a hybrid specification in which part of the in-
flation dynamics is explained by some backward looking component in order to
account for the inertia observed in inflation time series. To formally account for
this, we follow Galí and Gertler (1999) by assuming that only a fraction (1− ω)
of firms behave on a staggered basis when setting prices at each point of time.
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We denote by P ft the prices set by these forward looking firms. The remaining
firms, of measure ω, use instead a simple rule of thumb (backward looking) when
setting prices (P bt ). In logs, the price index of newly set prices is:
p∗t = (1− ω) pft + ω pbt (2.4)
The aggregate price level evolves as follows:
Pt =
·
θ P 1−εt−1 + (1− θ)(1− ω)
³
P ft
´1−ε
+ (1− θ)ω ¡P bt ¢1−ε¸ 11−ε
and we shall further assume that the backward looking firms set their prices
according to the following rule of thumb:
P bt = P
∗
t−1Πt−1
where Πt−1 = Pt−1/Pt−2.
2.3. Central Bank Reaction Function
Whereas the assumption of a representative agent in the private sector poses no
particular problems, it is harder to think of a single monetary policy rule for the
euro area, in which a variety of central bank policy rules coexisted before 1999.
Still, we cannot proceed to estimate the model without an explicit rule to shape
the endogenous behavior of the nominal interest rates, since otherwise a unique
rational expectations equilibrium, which the maximum likelihood method pins
down, would not be guaranteed.
We assume that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate following an
augmented Taylor-type monetary policy rule. In particular, the nominal rate
responds not only to the interest rate in the previous period and to deviations of
output and inflation from their steady-state but also to money growth:
ln(rt/r) = ρr ln(rt−1/r)+(1−ρr )ρπ ln(πt/π)+(1−ρr )ρy ln(yt/y)+(1−ρr )ρµ ln(µt/µ)+εrt
where the innovation εrt is normally distributed with standard deviation σr; and
µt =Mt/Mt−1 is the rate of money growth.
3
3The presence of nominal money growth in the rule makes it possible to interpret the rule as
a flexible monetary targeting one (see Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)).
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The rationale for this rule is that, given the potential importance of money to
affect the equilibrium output and price allocations, it may also have some value
as a monetary policy indicator of those variables. More generally, we can test
whether money plays an independent role in setting interest rates within this
class of rules.
2.4. Equilibrium
The symmetric equilibrium can be log-linearized to yield the following set of equa-
tions (see Appendix A):4
byt = Etbyt+1 − ψ1 [brt − Etbπt+1] + ψ2 [(bmt − bet)−Et(bmt+1 − bet+1)] + ψ1(1− ρa) bat
(2.5)
bmt = γ1 byt − γ2 brt + γ3 bet (2.6)
brt = ρr brt−1 + (1− ρr )ρy byt + (1− ρr )ρπ bπt + (1− ρr )ρµ bµt + εrt (2.7)
bµt = bmt − bmt−1 + bπt (2.8)
bπt = γf Et{bπt+1}+ γb bπt−1 + λ cmct (2.9)
cmct = µχ+ 1
ω1
¶ byt − ψ2
ψ1
(bmt − bet)− χ bzt (2.10)
bat = ρabat−1 + εat (2.11)
bet = ρebet−1 + εet (2.12)
bzt = ρzbzt−1 + εzt (2.13)
where the following relationships hold between structural parameters, the steady-
state, and the reduced form parameters of equations (2.5)-(2.10): ψ1 =
³
− Uc
CUcc
´
,
4The symbolbrepresent per cent deviations of a variable from its steady-state value.
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¢
, γ1 =
³
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m
ψ2
ψ1
+ (r − 1) 1
ψ1
´
γ2, γ2 =
r
(r−1)
e¯
m¯
³
Um
(r¯−1)eUcm−rUmm
´
,
γ3 = 1− (r − 1)γ2, λ ≡ (1− θ)(1− βθ)(1− ω) ξ φ−1, γf ≡ βθ φ−1, γb ≡ ω φ−1,
ξ ≡ (1−α)
1+α(ε−1) , φ ≡ θ + ω[1− θ(1− β)], and χ = ϕ+α1−α .5
Equation (2.5) represents the optimal intertemporal allocation of wealth. The
assumption of non-separability between consumption and real balances makes the
marginal utility of consumption a function of the amount of real balances optimally
demanded by the households. Hence, in equilibrium, output will depend on the
current and expected real balances after accounting for the money demand shock.
The effect of real balances on demand will vanish when the parameter ψ2 = 0, i.e.
as long as the cross derivative between consumption and real balances is zero in the
utility function. As stressed by Ireland (2001), non-separability is allowed for and
tested as one of the potential direct channels through which real balances can exert
real effects in the economy. Demand depends upon the present discounted value of
future real balances and short-term interest rates; this forward-looking character
is inherited from the dynamics of consumption, so the sensitivity of output to
interest rate movements depends upon the coefficient ψ1, which is related to the
inverse of risk aversion (i.e. intertemporal substitution attitudes).
Expressions (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) describe the money market. Equation (2.6)
is a standard money-demand equation, where the coefficients γ1 and γ2 are the
money-income and money-interest rate elasticities. Equation (2.8) is an identity
that specifies nominal money growth in terms of real balances and inflation.6
The supply side of the model is characterized by two equations: first, a New
Keynesian Phillips curve, (2.9), that allows for both expected and past inflation
terms as well as real marginal costs to affect current inflation; and second, a linear
relationship between the real marginal costs with detrended output, real balances
and the technology shock (2.10). Notice that, if we assume that all new prices (p∗t )
are set on a staggered basis, i.e. ω = 0, then inflation becomes a purely forward-
looking variable. The non-separability in preferences between real balances and
consumption generates a direct effect of the former variable on marginal costs and
then on inflation. Moreover, the assumption of decreasing returns to labor implies
that the effect of output on inflation depends not only on the degree of nominal
rigidities, but also upon the elasticity of output to employment (1 − α) and the
labor supply elasticity (ϕ) through the coefficient χ.
5The upper bar refers to the steady state value of the variable.
6Some authors refer to these equations as to a version of an optimizing IS-LM model (e.g.
McCallum and Nelson (1999)).
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As noted above, allowing for non-separability between real balances and con-
sumption leads real balances to play a direct role as a determinant of both output
and inflation equilibrium relationships. In this sense, the model resembles some-
what the reduced form P* model.7 In fact, our model provides a well-rooted
microfoundation for the direct effect of real balances in inflation, a key equation
of the P* setup. Notwithstanding, this model imposes cross-parameter restrictions
that should be tested in order to assess the empirical relevance of such hypothe-
ses. Finally, notice that what matters for the dynamics of output and inflation
is the change in real balances once the money demand shock has been taken into
account (i.e., bmt − bet). To close the model we include the AR(1) distribution
for the aggregate demand shock (2.11), the money demand shock (2.12) and the
technology shock (2.13), with innovations εat, εet and εzt respectively.
The estimation procedure follows Hansen and Sargent (2000), Kim (2000) and
Ireland (2001) who propose a maximum likelihood method to exploit the cross-
equation restrictions implied by the stationary solution of the model (2.5)-(2.13).
To that end the model is expressed in a state-space form as explained in Appendix
B and it is estimated using a recursive Kalman filter procedure. We use aggregate
euro area quarterly data from 1980:1 to 1999:4 for the logs of detrended output,
detrended real balances, inflation and gross nominal interest rates. The output,
inflation and nominal interest rate data comes from the Area Wide Model data set
(see Fagan et al. (2001)). Real output is measured through real GDP, inflation is
defined as the change in the log of GDP deflator, and the interest rate is the three
month money market rate. Real balances are measured dividing M3 by the GDP
deflator, and are obtained from the work by Brand and Cassola (2000).8 Figure
1 displays the data used in the estimation process.
3. Maximum-Likelihood Estimates
3.1. Testing the Real Balances Effect
Table 1 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of alternative models. In the
first column we present the parameter estimates corresponding to our benchmark
model. We test for the existence of a backward- looking component among the
7Hallman et al. (1991) provide evidence of how that model may explain the observed US
inflation.
8We thank Nuno Cassola for supplying us that variable.
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firms setting their price at t (ω ≥ 0).9 The unconditional means of the observable
variables (ln(y), ln(m), ln(π), ln(r)) are rather precisely estimated and imply a
reasonable quarterly discount factor (β = π
r
= 0.988).10 Most of the inertial
behavior of supply and demand is inherited through the high persistence presented
especially in both preferences (ρa) and supply (ρz) shocks.
Turning now to the model parameters, the most interesting result concerns
ψ2 that governs the separability of the utility function on real balances. The
estimation implies that real balances effect in the dynamics of demand (2.5) and
supply (2.9) is positive but not significant. Ireland (2001) also obtains a non-
significant effect for the US although he estimates a simpler model and finds a
negative value for the point estimate. The other parameter of the output equation,
the interest rate elasticity (ψ1), is significantly positive.
The estimates for the supply side of the economy reveals the importance of
the forward-looking component of inflation (i.e. γf). The slope coefficients of
the Phillips curve (λ and χ) are both significant and reflect that marginal costs
are an important determinant of inflation. The point estimates of λ (0.14) and
γf (0.62), are in the range of the ones estimated using only information about
euro area marginal costs by Galí, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001). Nevertheless,
assuming an average labour share for the euro area of (1 − α) = 3/4, the point
estimate of χ = ϕ+α
1−α (10.4) implies a value of the labor supply elasticity (1/ϕ) of
0.13, considerably lower than the one used in the business cycle literature, though
in line with microeconometric evidence.
Besides the direct real balance effects on demand and supply, money is also
related to the behavior of output and prices through the money demand and the
policy reaction function equations. The elasticity of money demand with respect
to output (γ1) and interest rate (γ2) are poorly estimated. As regards the interest
rate rule, the response to output (ρy) is nil, the inflation response (ρπ) is above
one and the smoothing parameter (ρr) is imprecisely estimated. Moreover, there
is a significant response to the rate of growth of money (ρµ = 0.53).
These results might be interpreted as if the (aggregate of) European monetary
authorities had followed a flexible monetary targeting strategy or inflation target-
9We impose γb = 1 − γf . This constraint is not exactly satisfied in the theoretical model.
As noted by Boivin and Gianonni (2001) it helps in estimating the model and the error is very
small for values of β close to one. This restriction makes it impossible to recover the parameters
ω and θ from the reduced form parameters γb, γf and λ.
10In order to restrict the steady state values for y and m some functional form for the utility
function would be needed.
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ing in which current money growth was a leading indicator of future inflation.11
This is striking given the poor role assigned to money in our estimates of output
and inflation equations; we will turn to this issue below. Notwithstanding, the
previous results are consistent with recent general equilibrium model estimates for
the US (i.e.Ireland (2001) and Keen (2001)), but slightly depart from the single
equation estimates provided by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) for the Bundes-
bank during a similar sample period.12 While, those authors found a significant
response of nominal interest rates to output, the response to monetary aggregates
was negligible.
In order to assess the quantitative importance of the estimated parameter
ψ2, measuring the real balance effect, we have estimated the model imposing
separability, i.e. ψ2 = 0. The likelihood value, in column (2) of Table 1, falls from
1425.0 to 1423.7. Thus, a likelihood ratio test does not reject the null of non-
separability at the 95% probability. Moreover, most of the remaining parameters
remain at a similar estimated value. In particular, notice that under separability
the parameter ψ1 identifies intertemporal substitution attitudes (i.e., σ =
1
ψ1
). As
it can be seen from the second column of Table 1, the estimated value is slightly
above one, close to the values used in the business cycle literature.
The most significant changes affect to the parameters of the money demand
equation and the smoothing of the interest rate rule. The interest rate elasticity,
γ2 = 0.31, remains very much in line with other estimated values,
13 but the in-
come elasticity takes a very small value, γ1 = 0.008, which contrasts with the usual
calibration of this parameter at its long-run value of γ1 = 1.0. It should be noticed
though that γ1 is a short run elasticity, since we are working at bussiness cycle
frequency; in fact this estimate is not far from the values obtained in single equa-
tion estimations that do not restrict that elasticity in the short-run (e.g.,Coenen
and Vega (1999) for the euro area). Later, we will discuss the implications that
changes in the properties of the money demand have on the business cycle prop-
erties of the model. The smootihing parameter ρr = 0.25 in the monetary policy
rule becomes significant.
11Gerlach and Svensson (2000) find that the real balances gap is a reliable leading indicator
for future inflation. Our model also includes a real money gap but makes explicit the market
structure and the agents’ decisions.
12Notice that the monetary policy of the current euro area countries became progressively
more influenced by that of the Bundesbank through the European Monetary System.
13See, for example, Chari et al. (2000) for the US.
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3.2. Money under Separability: Habit formation
From the previous results we cannot reject the hypothesis of separability in pref-
erences between consumption and real balances. This implies that money has no
direct effect on output and inflation; still, money appears to have a significant
role through the policy rule. Hence, fluctuations in money cannot account for the
observed output and inflation inertia. In this section we impose ψ2 = 0, though
we further enrich the structure allowing not only for backward-looking firms but
also for habit formation in consumption aimed as capturing both output and in-
flation persistence. This additional assumption has been emphasized by Fuhrer
(2000) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) as a potentially important
component of the monetary-transmission mechanism. In particular, it helps to
explain the existence of serial correlation in the response of output to monetary
policy shocks. We consider that the households preferences take the following
functional form:
U(Ct,
M
etPt
) =
µ
1
1− σ
¶·
Ct
Cht−1
¸1−σ
+
1
1− δ
·
Mt
etPt
¸1−δ
(3.1)
where the parameter of the curvature of the utility function, σ, is the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution h > 0 reflects dependence of current
utility on past consumption and δ is related to the interest rate elasticity of the
money demand. This changes the intertemporal demand, the money demand and
the marginal cost equations as follows:
byt = φ1
φ1 + φ2
byt−1 + βφ1 + φ2
φ1 + φ2
Etbyt+1 − 1
φ1 + φ2
[brt − Etbπt+1]−
βφ1
φ1 + φ2
Etbyt+2 + 1− βhρa
(1− βh)
(1− ρa)
φ1 + φ2
bat (3.2)
bmt = −φ1
δ
byt−1 + φ2
δ
byt − βφ1
δ
Etbyt+1 − 1
δ(r − 1)brt + βh(1− ρa)(1− βh)δ bat − δ − 1δ bet (3.3)
cmct = −φ1byt−1 + (χ+ φ2) byt − βφ1Etbyt+1 − (1 + χ) bzt −µβh(1− ρa)1− βh
¶bat (3.4)
where φ1 =
(σ−1)h
1−βh , φ2 =
σ+(σ−1)βh2−βh
1−βh
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Allowing for habit formation makes the demand equation (3.2) a function
relating current output to past and future output as well as to real interest rates
and preference shocks. Notice that as h → 0, expression (3.2) approaches to
the usual Euler equation for consumption under time-separable preferences. By
the same token, the existence of habits also induces higher dynamic relationships
between output and marginal costs. In addition, demand shocks have a direct
impact effect on both real balances and marginal costs. Again, when h → 0 we
recover the previous expression (2.10) under ψ2 = 0. Finally, the demand side
of the model present a much more complex dynamics. Moreover, the separability
of real balances implies a tight restriction between the interest rate elasticity and
the output elasticity of money demand trough the parameter δ.
Column (3) in Table 1 reports the estimated values for the parameters of
this augmented model. We find clear evidence of habit formation, which further
improves the fit of the model with a significant increase in the likelihood to 1428.8.
Thus, the strong significance of the parameter measuring habit persistence h is
not surprising. This is estimated at around 0.9, slightly higher than the value
of 0.8 obtained by Fuhrer (2000) for the US. The parameter of intertemporal
substitution (σ) is robust and remains close to one. The parameter δ is precisely
estimated implying strongly significant elasticities of the demand for money. The
implied point estimate of the interest rate elasticity is around 0.4 with a standard
error of 0.09. Notwithstanding, these estimates continues yielding an extremely
low value for the income elasticity (i.e. γ1 =
φ2
δ
) of 0.018 with a standard error of
0.0058.
The presence of habits in consumption affects the relationship between the
marginal cost and output too. On the one hand, we find that allowing for habit
formation, the backward-looking component of inflation becomes negligible. Thus,
we present the results under the restriction that γf = β, (i.e. ω = 0). On the
other hand, since the firms are not backward-looking, we may recover the degree
of price stickiness (θ), from the estimated slope coefficient, λ = 1.19. Given the
values for the average labour share ((1− α) = 3/4) and the steady state markup
( ε
ε−1 = 1.20), we obtain θ = 0.2, which implies that prices changes every 1.2
quarters. This very small degree of price inertia contrasts with the results found
in the model without habit formation corresponding with a much lower slope of
the Phillips curve. Moreover, the low value of χ implies that the implicit labor
supply elasticity is around 6, quite close to the assumption of a perfectly elastic
labor supply.
Aside from the interest rate smoothing parameter (now higher ρr = 0.5), the
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policy rule is largely unaltered. The main driving variables of the anticipated
part of the rule continue to be inflation and the money growth rate, although
now output has a significant but still small role in line with most of the existing
estimates of monetary policy rules. Finally, considering richer dynamics in the
output behavior brings the estimated persistence of the shocks to lower values.
We conclude that the habit formation model (under separability in real bal-
ances) gives a slightly different picture of the structural properties driving output,
inflation, money and the interest rate in Euroland, as compared to that in a model
without habit formation. On the demand side, while some crucial parameters, like
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the elasticities in the demand for
real balances, remain largely unchanged; it appears that consumption preferences
are more closely associated with the change in consumption rather than just its
level (i.e. habits). The supply side parameter estimates point towards little nom-
inal price stickiness, and high labor supply elasticity. We view these results as
compatible with low nominal inertia and high real rigidity (i.e. the existence of
a low response of real wages to large employment fluctuations). More explicitly,
given our assumptions about the labor market (i.e. frictionless), the only source
of real rigidities is a high labor supply elasticity. However, we do not claim that
intertemporal substitution is the dominant mechanism to understand the Euro-
pean labor market dynamics. Rather, we interpret these results as calling for an
extension of the model with non-competitive labor market features which might
be behind the observed real wage rigidity.14
A closer look at the estimated parameters reveals the likely cause of the dis-
crepancy among models in columns (2) and (3) as far as the degree of price inertia
is concerned. Notice that the estimated value of σ ≈ 1 makes φ1 ≈ 0 and φ2 ≈ 1,
thus rendering the anticipated part of the model without habit formation similar
to that of the model with habit formation regardless of the value of h. What a
high and significant value of h induces is a substantial difference across models in
the unaticipated part, since in the habit augmented model the innovation εat di-
rectly affects money demand and the real marginal costs (and thus inflation). This
suggests that the model without habit formation might be inadequately specified
since it excluded relevant sources of cross-correlations among the variables. Once
we allow for this cross-correlation, the source of inertia of inflation changes and
becomes partly explained by demand shocks. Consider the Phillips curves implied
by the model without habit formation,
14For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) contains an estimation with that
feature.
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bπt = γf Et{bπt+1}+ γb bπt−1 + λµχ+ 1ω1
¶ byt − λχ bzt (3.5)
and with habit formation,
bπt = γf Et{bπt+1}+ γb bπt−1 −λφ1byt−1 + λ (χ+ φ2) byt − λβφ1Etbyt+1
−λ (1 + χ) bzt − λµβh(1− ρa)
1− βh
¶bat (3.6)
If (3.6) were the true model, after a positive innovation εat we would expect a
rise in inflation (due to the increase in yt) partially compensated by the negative
direct effect of at. This low response of inflation is captured in the estimation of
(3.5) by a low elasticity with respect to yt, since it is not allowed a direct effect
of at.
4. A Quantitative Assessment of the Alternative Models
In this section we explore the implications of the estimated models in two direc-
tions. First we analyze the ability of the alternative models to match some of the
unconditional moments that appear in the data. This exercise does not need to
identify the sources of fluctuations in the economy. Second, we carry out standard
conditional exercises (i.e. variance decomposition and impulse responses) using
for that the estimated process of the structural supply and demand shocks.
4.1. Unconditional Moments
Table 2 shows the standard deviations of the variables, both in the data and those
estimated in the three models presented in the previous section. The benchmark
model that allows for non-separability in the utility function overpredicts the
variability of output, being more than twice the observed variance. The model
that imposes separability does even worse since the estimated output variability
is more than three times the observed one. By contrast, incorporating habit
formation in the model brings the variability of output down though it is still
above the observed value. Moreover, the estimated variability of real balances
and inflation are robust across models and close to that observed in the data.
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Figure 2 depicts the autocorrelation for output and inflation implied by an
estimated fourth order VAR for the euro area.15 Both variables display a high
persistence that remains significantly different from zero until approximately lag
ten for output and lag sixteen for inflation.16 Figure 2 also shows the simulated
autocorrelation function for the estimated models with separable real balances
(ψ2 = 0), with and without habit formation in consumption. Both models over-
estimate the observed persistence in the data, especially in the model without
habit formation.17 Clearly, these results are very much dependent of the distrib-
ution of the shocks. The estimated high persistence of the three shocks and the
assumption that they are uncorrelated lies behind these weak results in terms of
the unconditional moments.
4.2. Conditional Properties
Figure 3 compares the responses of output, inflation, nominal interest rates and
money growth in the two models estimated under separable preferences to both a
demand and a technology shock.18 Figure 3 (a) displays the response of these vari-
ables to an innovation (of one standard deviation size) in the demand shock. Under
both specifications, after a positive demand shock, there is a clear inflationary ef-
fect that calls for an instantaneous tightening of the monetary policy. The effects
of this shock implies very different output and money growth responses between
the two models but similar inflation and nominal interest rate responses. The
difference in the impact effect and the subsequent adjustment in output (hump-
shaped) observed in the second model (line with circles) is explained by the large
habit formation parameter and the lower shock persistence.
Figure 3 (b) displays the responses of the variables in both models to a nega-
tive technology shock. In this case the estimated process for the bzt shock in the
model without habit formation has a higher autocorrelation and standard error,
thus implying a very long-lasting effect of the shock on output. Under this shock,
though, the difference in output persistence produces a much bigger inflationary
15We estimated a 4-lag VAR model with detrended output and real balances, inflation and
nominal interest rates, all the variables in logs.
16Coenen and Wieland (2000) estimate a lower persistency for inflation than for output. We
suspect this might reflect that they are using detrended inflation as oposed to observed inflation.
17The estimated persistence of the cross-correlations between output and inflation and the
remaining variables is also significantly higher than that observed in the data. These estimates
are not shown to save space.
18All the numbers in the impulse responses are in annual terms.
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response effect under the habit formation model. Moreover, in this model the
impact fall in output, the subsequent recovery and the persistent increase in infla-
tion are compatible with an important increase at the same time in the nominal
interest rates and the money growth.
Next we analyze quantitatively the importance of the structural shocks. Table
3 presents the forecast error variance decomposition of the variables implied by
those two estimated models.19 Money demand shocks mainly help to forecast real
balances but they have almost no predictive power power as far as the movements
of output, inflation and interest rates is concerned. Both real demand and supply
shocks are the most important sources of fluctuations in output and inflation and
therefore in interest rates.
Do these simulated impulse responses and forecast error variance decompo-
sitions resemble in any way the available VAR evidence on the dynamic effects
of both supply and demand shocks? To answer this we compare the simulated
conditional properties with the empirical results of the VAR literature. We use
the evidence provided by Gerlach and Smets (1995) for the G-7 countries and by
Monticelli and Tristani (1999) for the euro area.20 Both VAR studies found, first,
that supply and IS shocks account for most of the observed output volatility over
the business cycle. Second, that real demand shocks are the main force behind
the inflation and the interest rate volatility. Third, monetary policy shocks have
a minor role in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations, basically explaining the
long-run volatility of inflation. These quantitative results are close to the ones
reported in Table 3, especially for the model with habit formation.
As regards the quantitative responses to demand and supply shocks, Gerlach
and Smets report that on average a positive demand shock expands output and
prices immediately and calls for an increase in interest rates. The size of the
impact effect for the euro area obtained by Monticelli and Tristani is of around
0.2% for output, 0.1% for inflation and of around 10 basis points for interest rates.
The results in Figure 3 for the model with habit formation (line with circles) are
of the same order of magnitude, especially for nominal interest rates and inflation:
a positive demand shock produces a contemporaneous increase in output of 0.1
19The non-separable preferences model has a variance decomposition of the shocks similar to
the model with separable preferences.
20These VARs studies do not use money in their information set, so they don’t separate
between money supply and money demand shocks.The identification criteria is that real demand
and monetary shocks do not have a long-run effect on output and that monetary shocks have
no contemporaneous effect on output.
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percentage points, an immediate increase of inflation of 0.12% and an interest rate
rise of around 12 basis points. The only caveat of the demand shock is that our
estimated models seem to overestimate the persistence of output, which in the
VAR dies away after 8-12 quarters.
With respect to a supply shock the VAR evidence is that the output effect
is very persistent and that inflation jumps on impact. Gerlach and Smets find
that the sign of the impact effect on interest rates varies across countries, whereas
for the euro area Monticelli and Tristani report an average positive increase in
interest rates after a negative supply shock. This coincides with our results in
Figure 3 for the model with habit formation and the size of the remaining effects
are also similar: a fall in output of between 0.3% and 0.4%, an inflation increase
of between 0.2% and 0.3% and an interest rate rise of 25 basis points.
5. Counterfactual exercises
As we have discussed above, the data does not support a model in which there
is a real balance effect. Thus, the limited influence of money on inflation and
output stems from the demand and supply interactions in the money market.
In this section we pursue this issue further. In particular, we carry out two
counterfactual exercises. The first one focuses on the role played by the income
elasticity of real balances. An income elasticity of one implies that velocity only
responds to movements in the interest rates. By contrast, in the estimated models,
a lower than one value for such an elasticity makes velocity dependent on income
too. We have analyzed the differences between those two elasticities in terms of
the impulse responses for the model without habit formation. The persistency
and the sign of the effects remains equal, what changes is the impact response
of the variables. As expected, the response of output both to a demand and to
a supply shock is much lower in the model with a unit income elasticity. This
is so because the rise in output leads (caeteris paribus) in this case to a major
reaction of interest rates, thus compensating somewhat the effect of a given shock
on output.
The second exercise is designed to assess the importance of the other channel
through which money may have a direct effect in this model: the response of
interest rates to money growth as estimated in the policy rule. Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999) have shown, in the context of a backward looking model, that
the difference between a monetary targeting and a flexible inflation targeting is
that the interest rate policy rule in the first case depends on current and lagged
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real money stocks. Similarly, our estimated reaction function can be rewritten
as a inflation targeting rule with a real balances term. Consider, for example,
the estimated model under separability and without habit formation, substituting
money growth in (2.7) by (2.8):
brt = 0.25brt−1 + (1− 0.25)(1.05 + 0.55)bπt + (1− 0.25)0.55(bmt − bmt−1) + εrt (5.1)
How important is that reaction function response to real balances? To answer
that question we repeated the conditional exercises from the previous section
imposing that in (5.1) the real balances coefficient is zero. Under this restriction
the responses of output, nominal interest rates, inflation and money growth to
both demand and supply shocks remain the same than the ones displayed in Figure
3. Consistently, the variance decomposition of the shocks under that restriction
is also equal to the one presented in Table 3. Therefore the outcome under a
policy rule that resembles a monetary targeting strategy is very similar to the
one followed under a flexible inflation targeting strategy (i.e. a Taylor rule); the
reason is that in our model the movements in real balances are mainly driven by
money demand shocks. Although money growth is statistically significant in the
policy rule the counterfactual shows that this variable is capturing some effect
linked to the inflation rate, rather than a true role for the quantity of money in
setting the interest rate.
The exercises in this section highlighted the importance of the specification
of money demand in the propagation of structural shocks in the Eurozone. We
also confirm that the level of real balances in the policy reaction function plays a
limited role in shapping the responses of output and prices to structural shocks.
6. Conclusions
We estimate a small scale dynamic general equilibrium model for the euro area
specified at the level of preferences and technology, that can be expressed in terms
of four building blocks: an intertemporal demand equation, a New Phillips curve,
a money demand equation, and a Taylor rule for monetary policy. A distinctive
feature of our model is the consideration of a direct effect of real balances in pri-
vate agents’ decisions and also on the central bank’s policy rule. Non-separability
between consumption and real balances and habit dependence in consumption
generate a rich dynamic structure for the marginal utility of consumption, which
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extends to marginal costs. The estimation is carried out by a maximum likeli-
hood method, exploiting the cross equation restrictions implied by the stationary
solution of the model.
The demand side is reasonably well estimated, implying logarithmic prefer-
ences in consumption. When allowing to habit formation we find similar esti-
mates to those existing in the literature. With respect to the monetary block, the
data accepts the separability between consumption and real balances; the policy
rule resembles the now familiar interest rate rules which assign a large weight to
inflation and money growth and a minor role to output. On the supply side, we
estimate a New Phillips Curve that is very much in line with the single equation
estimations. In particular, we find supporting evidence of an important forward
looking component in driving inflation dynamics. Nevertheless, once we enlarge
the model with habits in consumption, our estimates are consistent with a high
labor-supply elasticity and a low degree of price stickiness. Fluctuations in out-
put and inflation are mainly driven by real shocks whereas money demand shocks
affect only real balances. Finally, the implied impulse-response functions broadly
match those reported in the VAR literature.
Two results have potential interest for further research. First, no direct ef-
fect of money upon inflation and output is found, since preferences appear to be
separable in consumption and real balances. Interestingly, money growth plays a
significant role in the policy rule meaning that the European monetary authori-
ties may have paid special attention to a monetary aggregate either on its own, to
attain price stability, or because they consider it a leading indicator of future infla-
tion. However, this result is conditioned by the lack of a truly common monetary
policy during the sample period analyzed in the paper.
The supply side of the model is less precisely estimated and it changes some-
what as we move from our benchmark model to a model with habits in consump-
tion. The latter is consistent with a low degree of nominal inertia, but a high
elasticity of labor supply suggesting a non-negligible amount of real (wage) rigid-
ity. This difference may be explained on the basis of an inadequate specification
of the simpler model, but it might also be argued that intertemporal substitution
attitudes in leisure can hardly be behind a flat labor supply in economies with
high unemployment, like those in the Eurozone. Since our model allows neither for
labor market imperfections nor for adjustment costs in capital, this high elasticity
is about the only channel through which real rigidities can show up.
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Appendix A: Equilibrium conditions
Households
In the model with non-separability, the first order conditions of the household
problem are given by:
λt = atUct (A1)
atN
ϕ
t = λt
µ
Wt
Pt
¶
(A2)
λt = βrtEt
λt+1
πt+1
(A3)
λt − βEtλt+1 = (at/et)Umt (A4)
and the budget constraint (2.2), with mt = Mt/Pt, πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt, and λt the
Lagrange multiplier on (2.2). Using expressions (A3) and (A4) we can obtain the
following expression for the money demand:
(at/et)Umt = λt
µ
rt − 1
rt
¶
(A5)
Firms
They choose the price Pt(j) as to maximize the expected present discounted
value of future dividends:
max
Pt(j)
Et
∞X
k=0
(βθ)k λt+k
©
Yt,t+k(j)π
kPt(j)−Ψt,t+k(j)Yt,t+k(j)
ª
where Ψt,t+k(j) is the nominal marginal cost at t+k of the firm j setting its price
at t. Where Yt,t+k(j) =
³
πkPt(j)
Pt+k
´−ε
Yt+k.The first order condition is:
Et
∞X
k=0
(βθ)k λt+k
µ
P ∗t (j)
Pt+k
¶−ε
Yt+k
½
(1− ε)− Ψt,t+k(j)
P ∗t (j)
¾
= 0 (A6)
where P ∗t (j) represents the optimal price of the firms that change prices at time
t. The previous expression can be rearranged as follows:
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Et
∞X
k=0
(βθ)k λt+k
µ
πkP ∗t (j)
Pt+k
¶−ε
Yt+k
½
πP ∗t (j)−
ε
ε− 1Ψt,t+k(j)
¾
= 0 (A7)
notice that under k = 0 the firm’s problem becomes a static one, and the firm set
prices as a constant markup over marginal costs: P ∗t (j) = π
−1 ε
ε−1Ψt,t+k(j), with
ε
ε−1the firm’s desired gross markup.
The model is better expressed in terms of real marginal costs MCt,t+k. Thus,
Ψt,t+k(j) =MCt,t+k(j)Pt+k (A8)
Using expression (A8) in (A7) we obtain:
πP ∗t (j) =
µ
ε
ε− 1
¶ EtP∞k=0(βθ)k λt+k ³πkP ∗t (j)Pt+k ´−ε Ψt,t+k(j)
Et
P∞
k=0(βθ)
k λt+k
³
πkP∗t (j)
Pt+k
´−ε
This equation can be interpreted as a dynamic markup equation, so firms set
prices using the expected future evolution of demand and marginal costs.
As stressed by Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001a), the goal now is to
find an expression for inflation in terms of an observable measure of aggregate
marginal cost instead of the firm-specific marginal cost. To do this we proceed
in three steps. First, cost minimization implies that the firm’s real marginal cost
will equal the real wage divided by the marginal product of labor. Given Cobb-
Douglas technology, the real marginal cost of t+ k for a firm that optimally sets
its price at t is given by:
MCt,t+k(j) =
(Wt+k/Pt+k)
(1− α) (Yt,t+k(j)/Nt,t+k(j)) (A9)
where Yt,t+k (j) and Nt,t+k (j) are output and employment for a firm that has
set its price at t at the optimal value P ∗t . Second, following Woodford (1996)
we exploit the assumptions of a Cobb-Douglas production technology and the
isoelastic demand curve introduced to obtain the following log-linear relationship
between MCt,t+k and the actual real marginal cost in t+ k (MCt+k) as:
MCt,t+k(j) =MCt+k
µ
πkP ∗t (j)
Pt+k
¶−εα
1−α
(A10)
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Where:
MCt+k =
(Wt+k/Pt+k)
(1− α)(Yt+k/Nt+k)
The additional equations needed for the equilibium are the definition of the
price level, inflation and real balances and the government budget constraint:
Pt =
£
θ P 1−εt−1 + (1− θ) (P ∗t )1−ε
¤ 1
1−ε (A11)
πt =
Pt
Pt−1
(A12)
mt/mt−1 = (Mt/Pt)/(Mt−1/Pt−1) = µt/πt (A13)
Mt −Mt−1 = Tt (A14)
In a symmetric equilibrium all firms that reset their price at time t choose
the same price. Thus, P ∗t (j) = P
∗
t . Aggregating across firms (and assuming
Bt = Bt−1 = 0) we get the equilibrium conditions expressions (2.5)-(2.13) that
are already in log-deviations from the steady-state.
Steady State
In the absence of shocks, the economy converges to the steady state, which is
characterized by the following set of identities:
Y = C (A15)
r = π/β (A16)
π = µ (A17)
Y = Z(N)1−α (A18)µ
r − 1
r
¶
Uc = (
1
e
)UM (A19)
Uc =
µ
ε
ε− 1
¶
Nα+ϕ
(1− α)Z (A20)
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MC =
µ
ε− 1
ε
¶
(A21)
Extended Model: Habit Formation
Considering the household’s preferences (3.1), we have to replace expression
for λt (A1) by:
λt = at
·
Ct
Cht−1
¸−σ
1
Cht−1
− βhEt at+1
·
Ct+1
Cht
¸−σ
Ct+1
Ch−1t¡
Cht
¢2 (A22)
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Appendix B: Estimation procedure, model with separa-
ble preferences and habit formation.
This follows Ireland (2000)’s estimation procedure. The three optimality con-
ditions (3.2), (3.3), (2.9) (taking into account that the marginal costs satisfy
(3.4), the decision rule (2.7), the defintion of money growth (2.8), five expecta-
tional equations ( for bmt,brt,byt,bπt and Etbyt+1) and the three distribution processes
for the unobservables ((2.11), (2.12), (2.13)) form a system of thirteen equations
that may be written as
Af0t = Bs
0
t + Cvt (B1)
DEts
0
t+1 + FEtf
0
t+1 = Gs
0
t +Hf
0
t + Jvt (B2)
vt = Pvt−1 + εt (B3)
where:
f 0t = [byt brt bµt]0 ,
s0t = [brt−1 bmt−1 bπt−1 byt−1 bmt bπt Etbyt+1]0 ,
vt = [bat bet bzt εrt]0 ,
εt = [εat εet εzt εrt]
0
The model is solved along the following steps:
1) From (B1) to (B3),
Ets
0
t+1 = Ks
0
t + Lvt
where:
K = [D + FA−1B]−1 [G+HA−1B],
L = [D + FA−1B]−1 [J +HA−1C − FA−1CP ],
2) Define the matrices:
K =M−1NM =
·
M11 M12
M21 M22
¸−1 ·
N1 0
0 N2
¸ ·
M11 M12
M21 M22
¸
L =
·
L1
L2
¸
Where, N1 is diag(4) with the 4 eigenvalues of K within unit cicle (for the
predetermined variables in s0t : brt−1, bmt−1, bπt−1, byt−1) and N2 is diag(3) with the 3
eigenvalues of K outside the unit cicle (for the non-predetermined variables in s0t :bmt, bπt, Etbyt+1)
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3) Now let:·
M11 M12
M21 M22
¸
Ets
0
t+1 =
·
N1 0
0 N2
¸ ·
M11 M12
M21 M22
¸
s0t
+
·
M11 M12
M21 M22
¸ ·
L1
L2
¸
vt
or
Ets
1
1t+1 = N1s
1
1t +Q1vt
Ets
1
2t+1 = N2s
1
2t +Q2vt
where:
s11t+1 =M11

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+M12
 bmtbπt
Etbyt+1
 ,
s12t+1 =M21

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+M22
 bmtbπt
Etbyt+1

Q1 =M11L1 +M12L2, Q2 =M21L1 +M22L2
4) Solving for s12t+1 forward:
s12t = −N−12 Q2vt +N−12 Ets12t+1 = −N−12
∞X
j=0
N−j2 Q2P
jvt = −N−12 Rvt
5) Thus we may write,
 bmtbπt
Etbyt+1
 = −M−122 N−12 Rvt −M−122 M21

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
 = S1

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+ S2vt
s11t =M11

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+M12S1

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+M12S2vt
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or
[M11 +M12S1]

brtbmtbπtbyt
+M12S2Pvt
= N1 [M11 +M12S1]

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+ [N1M12S2 +Q1] vt
thus,

brtbmtbπtbyt
 = N1

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+ [M11 +M12S1]−1 [N1M12S2 +Q1 −M12S2P ] vt
or in compact form: 
brtbmtbπtbyt
 = S3

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+ S4vt
6) Now we can stack these expressions:

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1bmtbπt
Etbyt+1

=

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
S1

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+ S2vt

=
·
I(4,4)
S1
¸
brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+ · 0(4,4)S2
¸
vt
Thus:
29
f0t = A
−1B
·
I
S1
¸
brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+A−1B · 0S2
¸
vt = S5

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1
+ S6vt
7) The state-space solution of the model can be represented as:
brtbmtbπtbytbat+1bet+1bzt+1
εrt+1

=
·
S3 S4
0 P
¸

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1batbetbzt
εrt

+
·
0
I
¸
εat
εet
εzt
εrt


bytbrtbµtbmtbπt
Etbyt+1
 =
·
S5 S6
S1 S2
¸

brt−1bmt−1bπt−1byt−1batbetbzt
εrt

or
st+1 = Πst +Wεt (B4)
ft = Ust (B5)
The model in this state-space format is used to construct the likelihood func-
tion (see Hansen and Sargent, (2000)).
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Table 1. ML Estimates
Benchmark Model Separable Preferences (ψ2 = 0)
(ψ2 6= 0) No Habits Habit Formation
Estimated Parameters (1) (2) (3)
β 0.9881
(0.0038)
0.9878
(0.0014)
0.9876
(0.0031)
ψ1 0.9947
(0.0111)
0.9931
(0.0025)
-
ψ2 0.9120
(1.8674)
- -
σ - - 1.0573
(0.0306)
h - - 0.9025
(0.0286)
γ1 0.1971
(0.1117)
0.0083
(0.0007)
-
γ2 0.2503
(0.5438)
0.3130
(0.0622)
-
γ3 1.4290
(0.7348)
0.8323
(0.3657)
-
δ - - 108.76
(3.4942)
γf 0.6150
(0.2241)
0.6685
(0.0458)
0.9876
(0.0031)
χ 10.4338
(3.9166)
10.6670
(0.2097)
0.5432
(0.0034)
λ 0.1423
(0.0734)
0.2505
(0.0092)
1.1939
(0.0286)
ρr 0.1649
(0.1939)
0.2523
(0.0497)
0.5058
(0.0181)
ρy 0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0555
(0.0005)
ρπ 1.0525
(0.0946)
1.0487
(0.0621)
1.1796
(0.1482)
ρµ 0.5397
(0.0800)
0.5491
(0.0123)
0.6845
(0.0795)
y 4.2533
(0.0450)
4.2576
(0.0720)
4.2529
(0.0243)
m 4.0830
(0.0133)
4.0828
(0.0109)
4.0822
(0.0161)
π 0.0089
(0.0062)
0.0096
(0.0022)
0.0049
(0.0028)
r 0.0209
(0.0099)
0.0219
(0.0034)
0.0224
(0.0058)
ρa 0.9906
(0.0091)
0.9906
(0.0115)
0.9835
(0.0220)
ρe 0.9600
(0.0254)
0.9638
(0.0203)
0.9625
(0.0302)
ρz 0.9947
(0.0082)
0.9977
(0.0033)
0.9701
(0.0221)
σa 0.0551
(0.0509)
0.0558
(0.0661)
0.0495
(0.0660)
σe 0.0046
(0.0004)
0.0046
(0.0004)
0.0047
(0.0004)
σz 0.0050
(0.0004)
0.0052
(0.0005)
0.0046
(0.0005)
σr 0.0025
(0.0005)
0.0023
(0.0003)
0.0018
(0.0002)
Log-Likelihood 1425.01 1423.7 1428.8
Table 2. Standard Deviations (%)
Benchmark Model Separable Preferences (ψ2 = 0)
Data (ψ2 6= 0) No Habits Habit Formation
(1) (2) (3)
Variable
y 1.81 5.03 7.50 3.04
m 1.96 1.88 1.72 1.73
π 0.43 0.66 0.65 0.55
r 0.70 1.00 0.99 0.83
Table 3. Variance Decomposition (one year ahead) (%)
Output (y) Real Balances (m) Inflation (π) Interest Rate (r)
Modelεat εet εzt εrt εat εet εzt εrt εat εet εzt εrt εat εet εzt εrt
(2) 0.2 0.2 99.4 0.2 0.9 99.0 0.0 0.1 48.1 19.8 0.0 32.1 92.6 4.7 0.1 2.5
(3) 50.3 0.1 49.4 0.2 1.6 97.9 0.4 0.0 45.2 14.7 15.0 25.1 79.6 3.6 14.6 2.1
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Figure 1. Time Series Plots
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Figure 2. Autocorrelation Function of output and inflation
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(b) Model without Habit Formation
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(c) Model with Habit Formation
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Figure 3. Impulse-Responses: Model without Habit Formation vs. Model with Habit formation
(a) Responses to a Preference Shock
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(b) Responses to a Technology Shock
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Note: circle line (model with habits) vs. continuous line (model without habits)
